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Jan-Werner Müller’s (2016) account of populism purports to establish a 
minimalistic conception of populism. Populists, on Müller’s account, say 
that they are (i) against pluralism, and (ii) against corrupted elites. But, so 
my argument holds, Müller’s account is conceptually arbitrary and 
critically futile. Müller himself suspects that his views might be viewed as 
“profoundly conservative” (p. 68). This is largely an accurate self-
diagnosis, even if Müller himself is quick to dismiss it. 
Thus, tellingly, Müller writes, “[I]n Machiavelli’s Florence, fighting for 
the popolo against the grandi would not automatically be populism, but 
saying that the grandi do not belong in Florence, no matter what they say 
or do, would be populism” (p. 23). Notice how this account places a very 
high premium on what alleged populists say and places no value on 
what they do. Müller’s theory, on first pass, is a speech-heavy theory, 
rather than a behavior-oriented theory. Of course, following speech-act 
theory, speech might be viewed as a sort of behavior, but Müller doesn’t 
seem to think so. At heart, what matters is what populists claim to be 
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doing, indexed by their words, rather than what they actually do: while 
populists may do things that Müller finds disagreeable, it is their 
statements that define them, according to Müller. 
Antipluralism takes place when “populists claim that they, and only 
they, represent the people” (p. 20; emphasis in original). The emphasis 
here ought to be on the verb claim: what matters to Müller is that they 
claim to be antipluralist. Similarly, antielitism takes place when populists 
“justify their conduct by claiming that they alone represent the people” (p. 
4). Once again, the emphasis is on claims-making: they claim to 
represent the people. Whether they actually do so is, on Müller’s account, 
insignificant. What matters, conceptually speaking, and as the title of the 
first chapter makes clear, is “what populists say.” Populism “employs a 
very specific kind of lanugage” (p. 40), and it is this language we should 
care about, analytically speaking, in constructing a concept of populists, 
Müller contends. 
But why should we feel so strongly about what supposed populists 
say? This sort of Habermasian fixation on language is all too 
characteristic of the scholastic view, which tends to fetishize language at 
the cost of valorizing actions more conventionally understood: the 
allocation and expenditure of social energy, the implementation of policy, 
the re-arrangement of institutions—these should probably play at least 
some part in our conceptual underpinnings. 
Similarly, Müller falls for the Weberian fetish of the ideal-type. His is 
a policeman’s attitude to the realm of concepts. Even when political 
actors claim to be populists, they may not turn out to be populists at all 
because they do not fit into Müller’s theoretical scheme: “We have to 
allow for the possibility that a plausible understanding of populism will in 
fact end up excluding historical movements and actors who explicitly 
called themselves populists.” (p. 19) Take note of the phrase “plausible 
understanding”—those are weasel words, subtly giving rise to a form of 
question-begging. There is no inherently good reason why we should 
accept the foundation of Müller’s typology—linguistic expressions of 
antielitism and antipluralism—over some other set of criteria. What 
makes Müller’s scheme “plausible” is simply an argument by assertion – 
and a slotting in of empirical examples that Müller then, conveniently, 
thinks slots into this schema. The whole point of this symbolic operation 
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is to allow political scientists to demarcate the proper bounds between 
objective, “real populists,” and subjective populists, those “merely 
branded as populists” (p. 10). But this entire business of analytic propriety 
and plausibility is founded on a series of asserted axioms that are as 
arbitrary as any other exercise in conceptual demarcation. 
In this specific instance, Müller’s conceptual demarcation is 
essentially fruitless because it doesn’t get us anywhere, strategically and 
analytically. So what if Donald Trump and Hugo Chávez are lumped 
together in a single category (or perhaps worse, Evo Morales, Mussolini, 
and Hitler, by Müller’s own admission [e.g. p. 94])? What happens next? 
Does it allow us to discern anything beyond the faintest of family 
resemblances? Slicing up social reality is the first, not the final, step, and 
Müller doesn’t answer where it is we are going. If the aim is scientific, 
then the operation is essentially founded on contingent, take-it-or-leave-it 
claims – hardly as scientific as many political scientists would have us 
believe. If the aim, on the other hand, is critical, it would be far more 
useful to show all the myriad ways in which each of these specific 
political actors may have produced outcomes that are harmful or 
injurious, what are their origins, and what can be done to counteract or 
resolve them; and this critical enterprise is not at all aided by typological 
sorting of the kind that entomologists and Weberians seem so fond of. 
Müller thinks populists ultimately end up doing three things once 
they have gained power. They will (i) occupy the state, (ii) engage in 
mass clientelism and corruption, and (iii) suppress civil society (p. 102). 
But all of these actions are in the eyes of the beholder and are non-
specific to those said to be populists. Occupy the state? Fine, perfect! A 
political movement that actually wants to achieve anything must occupy 
the state – must ensure, in brief, that the state obeys its will. If not, its 
political agenda will be held up by bureaucrats, judges, and lobbyists 
with their own agendas, many of them deeply symbolic, political, and 
value-laden, but with the thinnest of technocratic covers (bureaucratic 
expertise, legal competence).  
Mass clientelism and corruption? Again, modern politics is mostly 
patronage by another name: tit for tat, giving favors and receiving them in 
return. Quite how one is to engage in the complex business of 
administering modern societies without granting favors for favors in kind 
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– to labor unions, for instance – is hugely puzzling. Very probably it 
cannot be done. And Müller admits the centrality of reciprocity to modern 
politics tout court: what he doesn’t like about populists is that “they can 
engage in such practices openly” (p. 46). By implication, then, he seems 
to suggest that so long as such practices are carried on quietly, behind 
closed doors, all is well in the realm of politics. What Müller doesn’t like is 
the very public nature of such things – as well as a bit of snobbish nose-
turning against such people as Jörg Haider’s political stunt—for that is all 
it was—that consisted of handing out euro bills to potential voters. Few 
respectable politicians “would go so far,” Müller writes, but he doesn’t 
seem to understand that this is precisely why some politicians engage in 
such stunts—to carve out a niche, to extract symbolic profits from 
heterodoxy, if not outright heresy. 
Suppressing civil society? Every society does it, if only by ensuring 
that funding doesn’t reach NGOs disfavorable to ruling elites, mobilizing 
police and surveillance against activists, or excluding civil society actors 
from public consultations. Civil society is just the state by another name – 
the state by extension – as Bourdieu (2014: 31-36) points out: their 
constituent parts’ autonomy is highly relative in modern societies, if one 
considers the regulatory frameworks that ensconce them and the funds 
and tax credits that flow their way. Now this isn’t necessarily a good 
thing, and perhaps we should want a different set of socio-political 
arrangements to keep it from happening, but it does rather undermine 
Müller’s point that this is somehow unique to regimes said to be populist. 
Against Müller’s inchoate and overly wide conception of populism 
– as noted, by his own admission, Müller’s is a theory that includes Evo 
Morales and Hitler (p. 94) z- I think there is only one characteristic that, 
analytically and strategically, should be used to define populism: pretend 
or faux anti-neoliberalism. Minimally populistic regimes pretend to 
counteract the hegemony of markets and protect the people against 
market forces, while in reality setting about dismantling the welfare state 
and promoting corporate interests. “While the reality in Hungary has 
been savage cuts to the welfare state, Orbán’s self-presentation as a 
strong leader ready to nationalize companies and use the state to protect 
ordinary folk from multinationals has been highly effective,” Müller writes 
perceptively (p. 59). Recall also that Nigel Farage’s Leave campaign 
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scored major points on the infamous claim that Brussels was draining 
Britain’s coffers to the tune of 240 million pounds per week – funds which 
were to be reallocated to save the long-ailing National Health Service. Of 
course, no such funds were forthcoming, and the figure was largely a 
fabrication (see e.g. Clegg 2017). But the promise to restore the dignity of 
one of the five central pillars in William Beveridge’s vision of the “people’s 
peace,” was extremely effective. Similarly, Trump has promised to protect 
“the little man” against corporate greed – again, a hollow promise made 
by a politician unlikely to disturb the fundamental tenets of neoliberalism.  
In short, defining populism in this way gets at a more crucial point 
about the political successes of populists: they have promised a sort of 
paternal protection, offering devotion to the people and assuring them 
that their their social (or market-driven) suffering will now be relieved. 
Populism promises to set the world aright, a world made miserable by 
neoliberalism. In terms of political strategy, viewing populism as a false 
antineoliberalism also points ahead to a future that really would 
transcend populist movements and regimes, unlike Müller’s prescription 
of a return to more liberal democracy (which, without further 
emendation, would only produce the phenomenon of populism all over 
again, given enough time). This point of transcendence is a world 
beyond global capital. Unlike Müller’s conception of populism, this 
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